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The theme of this paper emerged out of an attempt to trace and explain the tradition 
of radical, non-racial trade unionism, which remained a considerable force within the 
South African labour movement until the early 1950s. A n  llinstitutionalll history of 
trade unions in South Africa can only be attempted in conjunction with a wider class 
analysis of the society. In this regard, recent work has considerably refined our 
understanding of the nature of the "white working class", and the structural conditions 
which restricted any alliance with black workers. It is argued that many white wage 
earners were no longer productive workers, but over time came to perform a policing 
function within production, and that they existed in an antagonistic relationship to 
black workers. (2) At a political level this made possible the co-optfan of tlie 
"white working class", symbolized by the Pact Government of 1924. 
Whilst recent writers (3) do allow for the possibility of differentiation 
in the class determination of sections of the "white working class", it is perhaps 
necessary to stress that a sizeable group of whites remained productive workers, and 
that this implies the continued possibilities of independent political action by a 
section of the official labour movement and of non-racial class alliance in the work 
place. These possibilities were temporarily and imperfectly realized during the years 
1925-30. In a period of rapid change in the nature of the work force and the division 
of labour, particularly in the consumer products manufacturing sector - shoes, clothing 
and furniture, a number of industrial unions were founded which adopted a non-racial 
trade union strategy. Similar unions emerged to represent workers in the laundry, 
rope and oanvas, chemicals and confectionery industries. 
The immediate prehistory of this period presents a picture of failure and 
defeat. In the aftermath of the 1922 Rand Revolt, trade union membership fell from 
108,242 to 81,861 (4), and the central co-ordinating body, the SA Industrial Federation, 
collapsed. The general effect of the failure of the 1922 strike was to make the unions 
very wary of strike action. This rejection of industrial militancy took institutional 
form, with the passage of the Industrial Conciliation Act, 1924, which brought trade 
unionism firmly within a system of conciliation, involving the increasing 
bureaucratization of trade union leadership. (5) 
At the same time, the ICU, under the leadership of Clements Kadalie, had 
become an agrarian-based populist movement with a large but scattered and unorganized 
membership. It has been argued that the only section of the ICUfs membership which 
was capable of being organized effectively was the African urban working class, "and 
it is in their failure to organise this group that the ICU can chiefly be 
criticisedf1. (6) Thus the ICU failed to support African workers during the 1927 strikes 
in Durban and Johannesburg. By this time, Kadalie, supported by the Amsterdam 
International ayld the British TUC, and increasingly under the influence of white 
liberals, had rejected militant trade unionism. In 1927, after expelling communist 
office-holders from the union, Kadalie declared that "strikes were wicked, useless 
and obsolete". (7) 
11. Secondary Industrialization and the Labour Process 
Between 1915/16 and 1929/30 the number of manufacturing establishments in 
the Union increased from 3,638 to 6,645, whilst the total number employed in private 
industry rose from 101,178 to 201,180. (8) However, these general statistics for 
manufacturing as a whole mask certain important distinctions. Thus D. H. Houghton, 
discussing the expansion of manufacturing during the period 1925-29, makes the point: 
Many of the new factories were producing final 
consumers' goods, often from imported raw materials 
or from semi-finished products. For example, 
clothing manufacture from imported textiles preceded 
by many years the growth of a textile industry, in 
spite of the fact that South Africa was a major 
producer of wool. This ... is to be explained by the 
size of the market, the relative amount of capital 
required and by certain technical factors. (9) 
In fact, statistically these consumer goods industries did not grow at a greater rate 
than secondary industry generally during this period. (10) However, qualitative changes 
were taking place in this sector. Thus, despite their parallel expansion, the metal 
and engineering industries remained based on a simple division of labour between the 
skilled worker and the labourer. A similar division of labour in the consumer products 
industries was breaking down by the mid-20s. This period witnessed, for the latter, 
the fragmentation of skilled work, and the reorganization of the labour process on 
the basis of "semi-skilledff operative labour. 
Two conditions were necessary for this development to take place: sufficient 
capital and technology to facilitate the introduction of repetition techniques, and a 
market large enough to support mass production. In the first place, the continued 
expansion of the urban work force created the market. Equally important, the Pi,ct 
Government's policy of tariff protection safeguarded this potential market for local 
capitalists. 
It is in regard to questions of capital requirements and technological 
conditions that it is necessary to distinguish sharply between sections of manufacturing 
industry: between basic metals and engineering, and the consumer products industries. 
The former, to establish themselves on a mass production basis, required massive 
capital investment and the introduction of a complete, new machine technology. Thus 
during the early 1920s local private enterprise failed to establish the iron and steel 
industry on a large-scale basis, and the task had to be completed by the state. When 
ISCOR was founded in 1928, it was with a capital of R7 million. (11) Engineering, 
before World War 11, was organized to undertake repairs and ffjobbingf' work, largely 
for the mines and railways. (12) Only the huge stimulus provided by war orders enabled 
the industry to establish itself on a mass production basis. 
Ln comparison, it was possible for the consumer products industries to 
transform their ffcraftff basis with relative ease. The statistics indicate that the 
average value of firms involved in leather, furnituse and wearing apparel was kplf 
that of those in the metal industries. (13) In the clothing industry, entrance was 
comparatively easy. In the late 1930s "a firm producing men's clothes could be run 
economically with about 60 machines, which would involve an outlw of about £4,500 for 
production plant1'. (14) Similarly, figures for the furniture industry indicate fairly 
low capital investment. (15) In these industries, the reorganization of production on 
the basis of specialization and increased sub-division of labour was at least as 
important as new capital, or mechanization. In the garment industry particularly, the 
advent of factory production was not marked by any breakthrow in sewing machine 
technology. 
It is possible to give a fairly detailed picture of the development of the 
gaxment industry during this period. Factory production developed out of the bespoke 
tailoring workshop through a process of increasing subdivision of labour. (17) The 
original organization of production was on the basis of the journeyman tailor, who .. 
would mike the garment, aided by a male or female assistant, who would perform the I 
less skilled tasks. Increasingly this gave way to the "set system1': I 
A set on the Witwatersrand generally consists of the 
foreman or organiser of the set, who is himself a 
tailor, another tailor, a presser, and a machinist, 
all males, and two, sometimes three, tailoresses. (18) 
Here lies the beginnings of specialization in the industry: 
Where the set system prevails, there are workers who 
ase exclusively pressers or machinists. (19) 
By this time, also, wholesale bespoke tailoring factories were manufacturing 
ready-made garments, as well as producing made-to-measure garments under factory l 
conditions: l 
The employees engaged on this  wholesale bespoke! 
work generally do not h o w  whether they are working 
on orders for bespoke or ready-made garments. (20) 
However, the set system remained firmly yithin the traditional relations of 
production, which allowed the journeyman tailor to own the tools of production. It 
was the merchant tailor, however, who held the power to initiate production. He took 
the orders and mea,sured the customer. The details were passed on to the master tailor, 
who either individually or on the basis of the set system fulfilled the order. This 
system worked entirely in the interests of the merchant tailor, who could force down 
the price of work amongst the competing master tailors, who were completely dependent 
upon him for orders. However, such a system involved severe restrictions on the 
development of the industry. To establish the clothing industry on the basis of 
modern factory production required that the capitalist take direct control over 
production, to facilitate the provision of capital and the standardization of products. 
In fact, by 1928, the majority of the clothing industry was established on a factory 
basis, a d  had freed itself from the production relations which characterized bespoke 
tailoring. (21) 
The Labour Force 
Manufacturing industry was still in its early stages in South Africa during 
the 1920s. Thus, in order to accumulate capital for investment, employers so@t out 
the cheapest source of labour. Furthermore, in order to establish production on a basis 
of large-scale repetition, a-particular t ype  of labour force was required - one which 
was to perform predominantly llsemi-skilledll work at wages considerably lower than would 
be accepted by skilled workers, so breaching the areas of control within the labour 
process held by the skilled workers. These workers were recruited from the raYlks of 
the newly proletarianized, both black and white, who had been forced off the land as 
a result of the increasing domination of large-scale capitalist agriculture. The 
statistics for employment in private industry reveal a distinct pattern of labour 
recruitment for secondary industry. (22) 
Two trends are immediately obvious from these figures: (a) the rapid growth of white 
female labour, and (b) the growing preponderance of African males as a proportion of 
the entire work force. 
The specific historical circumstances of conquest and the development of 
the mining industry had resulted in a massive disparity between skilled and unskilled 
or semi-skilled wages. In particular, continued subsistence production in the reserves 
had allowed the mineowners to pay African workers a wage below the necessaq level for 
the reproduction of their labour power. (23) Secondary industry could thus benefit 
from an already established labour market. Furthemore, as F. A. W. Lucas, KC, 
Chairman of the Wage Board during this period, argued, this clisparity in wage 
rates ("which mi&t be roughly stated as the difference between £1 a day and £1 a 
week") led to considerable pressure for deskilling and the downward reclassification 
of skilled work (24): 
... the skilled worker's wage was relatively to the 
native's wages so high that much of the semi-skilled 
work which formed part of the skilled man's work was 
handed over to the native, generally without any 
increase of wages . . . 
On the other hand, this process implies that many African workers, whilst 
still classified as labourers, were actually engaged on semi-skilled work, indicating 
an increasingly stable African working class. Roux argues that it was this which made 
possible the organization of black trade unions in the late 1920s. (25) 
The recruitment of white female labour took place for the same sorts of 
reasons. Veronica Brechey (26) has argued that female labour is particularly 
attractive to capital at a stage in its development, for two reasons. Firstly, by 
virtue of the existence of the family, women workers, as wives and da-ters, are 
dependent upon the h~sband/~arents, respectively, for part of the costs of reproducing 
their labour power. Significantly, bearing in mind Wolpels work, she goes on to 
compare the position of married women with that of semi-proletarianized workers "since 
they too can be paid wages at a price which is below the value of labour power". In 
fact, in South Africa, it was Wage Board policy to take two-thirds of the mants rate 
as the standard for women's wages. (27) Secondly, capital introduces female labour in 
order to restructure the labour process to its advantage. Work traditionally 
undertaken by skilled, male workers was fragmented, thus undermining positions in the 
labour process which the latter had come to control. 
The same imperatives lay behind the increased employment of juveniles, 
particularly in the furniture industry. The Wage Boasd, in 1930 declared that the 
number of unqualified "probationers" employed in the industry was excessive. The 
Board found that during November-December 1928 there were 596 skilled workers to 734 
juveniles an& apprentices employed in the furniture industry on the Rand. (28) The 
process of job fragmentation and deskilling was transforming the apprenticeship system 
into a cheap labour device. In his report to the 1930 Conference of SATE, A. M. Medcel 
makes the point: 
The question arises again, is systematic apprenticeship 
a practical and satisfactory method t o m ,  remembering 
that the young worker is bound by contract from 5 to 6 
years to an occupation wherein mass production and 
reptitition work has replaced technique and skill? (29) 
During the 1930s the fbmiture workers were to lead an agitation for the amendment of 
the Apprenticeship Act, a move which was strongly opposed by the old craft unions, 
such as the Amalgamated Ehgineering Union and the SA Ty-pogcaphical Union, whose skills 
had not yet been undermined. 
111. Trade Union Response 
This paper seeks to argue that trade union structure and politics must be 
understood in relation to the particular labour process. (30) Thus craft (or llclosedfl) 
trade unionism is based upon the ability of the union to control the supply of labour 
at a crucial point in the labour process. This is dependent upon the existence of 
certain skills. The industrial union (or "openff union), on the other hand, in order 
to gain bargaining power must rely on strength of numbers, ideally enlisting all 
workers within the particular industry. (31) This form of trade unionism is obviously 
more suited to the unskilled and semi-skilled worker, and would tend to predominate 
where wide-ranging deskilling had occurred. These kinds of processes were evident 
particularly in the development of the Furniture Workers! Union and the Garment 
Workers Union during the late 1920s. Skilled workers in these industries saw their 
position within the labour process progressively undermined, and came to constitute a 
relatively declining section of the work force in their industries. Initially, they 
tried to resist what they saw as encroachment by cheap unskilled labour. However the 
rapidity of deskilling forced them to abandon their craft organization and to seek to 
protect themselves by extending trade union organization to all workers in the 
industry, irrespective of colour, and in this way to prevent competition and 
undercutting. 
A history of the early Garment Workers Union (the strongest llnewll union to 
emerge from this period) and its predecessor, the Witwatersrand Tailors' Association, 
demonstrates many of the arguments which this paper tries to put forward. The W A  had 
been dominated by master craftsmen, deeply rooted in the British craft tradition. (32) 
During the early 120s most still worked in small tailoring shops, and in fact at that 
time the WTA still included lfmiddlemen" in its membership (tailors who took work from 
the merchant tailors to sub-contract to others). (33) The membership of the union 
changed dramatically with the expansion of factory production. In December 1925, a 
meeting of factory workers was held to elect a committee for the Factory Section of 
the union. (34) During 1926, Dan Colraine became union organizer. Within four months 
the membership of the Factory Section was increased by 300, with 900/o organization of 
factory workers on the Rand. (35) By 1928, when Sachs became Secretary of the W, 
the membership was 1,750, of whom two-thirds were in the Factory Section and three- 
quarters were women workers. (36) 
It is interesting to chart the changing response of the WTA to perceived 
threats from other sections of workers. In 1924 the union called for the replacement 
of "Kaffir pressers" by whites. (37) The same point was made, together with an 
alleged threat of Asiatics to white standards, in evidence to the Cape Town Conference 
on unemployment called by the Secretary for Labour. (38) There were also complaints 
that firms were increasingly employing white, girl machinists to do the work of 
trouser-makers. (39) However, in August 1926 the unionls constitution was altered to 
admit non-Europeans (40) (i.e. Indians and Coloureds, since Africans were not eligible 
to join a registered trade union). Also, from 1928, Sachs gave moral, and often 
tangible, support to the black Clothing Workers1 Union, formed by Gana Makabeni. (41) 
By this time, the GWU was also actively organizing female machinists. The threat of 
undercutting and job-fragmentation, which accompanied repetition techniques of 
production, forced the WTA to open its ranks to an increasingly semi-skilled work 
force . 
The South African Trade Union Congress, formed in 1925, and under the 
secretaryship of W. H. Andrews, did much to foster new industrial unions. These 
unions included the Furniture Workers, Sweetworkers, Leather Workers, Canvas and Rope 
Workers, and a Reef Native Trade Assistants Union. (42) Bill Andrews!~ support for 
industrial unions should be stressed. During the war he had worked in Sheffield with 
J. T. Murphy, an engineering worker who took a leading part in the shop stewards 
movement and in the struggle for industrial unionism. Andrews was undoubtedly 
influenced by this experience. (43) If Trembath and Gitshants book on Labour 
Organization (published 1926) is at all representative of trade union thinking at the 
time, then it would seem that the theory of industrial unionism was in the ascendancy: 
... it is safe to say that the vision of the future is the 
orgdnization of all the workers on industrial lines with 
some controlling council for the whole of South Africa. (44) 
These "new" unions were able to make progress, freed from the conservative hold of the 
older craft unions, which refused to join SATUC, allegedly because of left-wing control 
and the absence of a colour bar. (45) Also, some of these older unions, particularly 
the AEU and the Mineworkers! Union, were declining in membership over this period. (46) 
One of the most striking features of the SATUC period was the attempt, for 
the first time, to organize women workers (almost exclusively white). The leading 
figure was Fanny KLennerman, who attended the first SATUC conference in 1925 on behalf 
of the newly fomed Women Workers! General Union. The W was instrumental in the 
organization of the Sweetworkersf Union and a Waitresses! Union, as well as aiding 
women workers in the distributive trades. (47) The militancy of the "new unionsw is 
exemplified in the methods adopted by the WWU: 
The WWU is increasing its strength and influence and 
is adopting the method of lunchtime meetings outside the 
various shops, works and factories in order to bring 
home to the women workers the need for organization and 
the fact that there is a union catering for them and 
willing to take up their cause. (48) 
The first African industrial unions began to appear early in 1927, largely 
ow-f-ng to the initiative of Comunist Party members Weinbren and Thebidi. (49) These 
first Unions included a Laundry Workers! Union, a Bakers! Union, the Clothing Workers! 
Union and the Mattress and Furniture Workers! Union, usually gmwing in parallel with 
a sympathetic registered union. In 1928 %he South African Federation of Non-European 
Trade Unions was fomed, which, at its height, claimed to represent 15,000 black 
workers. (50) 
The latelp0s was a period of considerable industrial militancy amongst 
African workers. In 1927, 4,418 "non-whites" went on strike (as compared with 740 
whites), whilst for 1928 the figures were 5,074 and 710, respectively. (51) The 
pattern seems to have been one of strikes in response to the victimization of trade 
unionists, and strikes designed to enforce payment of the legal wage rates laid down 
by the Wage Board. In May 1928, African workers brought Leonardols Laundry to a 
standstill after the victimization of one of the employees, Although forced back to 
work by the police, the strikers secured his reinstatement. (52) During the same 
month the Native Clothing Workers! Union successfully co-ordinated a one-day strike in 
three Johannesburg factories to demand full payment for Good Friday. (53) On 
September 25 1928, 170 African, Indian and Coloured workers at the Transvaal Mattress 
Company struck to enforce the implementation of a Wage Board determination. "Before 
nightfall the employers had capitulated and advised the ~ttress and Furniture Workers! 
Union (non-mopean) that the demands of the workers would be fulfilled." (54) In 
October, African furniture workers at the Louis and Metz factory struck successfully 
for payment for overtime. (55) 
The use of lightening strikes over immediate issues indicates effective 
shop-floor initiative, and the considerable success of this tactic demonstrates the 
bargaining power of the workers. The effective militancy of African workers is 
demonstrated by the strike at Donnerls Laundry in October 1929. The strike, which 
was 1000/o solid, was called over the issues of working conditions and the failure to 
implement Wage Board deterainations. "The boss offered to reinstate all but two on 
conditions demanded by the union, but these terms were rejected and the strikers took 
their passes and subsequently obtained employment in other laundries." (56) This 
statement indicates that the black unions were working in a favourable employment 
situation. Conversely, it can be argued that the depression undermined the position 
of black trade unionism and led to the collapse of the FNETO. It is probably also 
true that this decline was hastened by the internal conflicts in the Communist Party, 
and the ultrslrleft policies pursued by Wolton and Bach, In the same way that the ICU 
had tied its fdrtunes to the careers of a few individuals, so the Federation was too 
closely linked to the CP to survive the internal conflicts of the latter. 
This paper has tried to suggest that, in certain sections of secondary 
industry at least, the interests of black and white workers were not necessarily 
antagonistic. In these industries white workers remained productive. In fact, in the 
case of white women workers, they were specifically employed for their potentially 
higher rate of exploitation. White workers in these sectors had not yet assumed 
predominantly supervisory roles. Thus there was no antagonism arising out of questions 
of "authorityt1 in the work-place. It was also a period during which craft sectionalism 
was being broken down. In the face of rapid deskilling, and the introduction of 
repetition methods of production, the old sections of skilled workers - e.g. the 
tailors and cabinet makers - abandoned exclusive craft unionism in favour of an all- 
inclusive industrial unionism. Thus, in the consumer products industries, white and 
black workers were less differentiated by questions of craft or skill. Contemporary 
communists certainly believed that the possibility for non-racial working class 
alliance existed (57), and the incidence of joint strike action by black and white 
workers seemed to substantiate this view. 
In May 1928, 400 a t e  workers (7% women) from Germiston' S three clothing 
factories s t m k  over the victimization of three workers. The Native Clothing Workers' 
Union, which was 1000/o strong in Germiston, offered to bring its members out in support. 
Some 120 African workers struck in solidarity. As a result of these actions the three 
dismissed workers were reinstated. (58) However, only a week or two later, the white 
workers failed to assist black workers in a similar dispute, involving the dismissal 
of a black. In this case the Chairman and the Secretary of the Clothing Workers' 
Union, Gana Makabeni and Thebidi, and four others were charged under the Riotous 
Assembliss Act, whilst 75 of the strikers were charged under the Masters' and Servants' 
Act, and each sentenced to ten days I imprisonment, or a fine of £1. (59) There were 
other examples of inter-racial solidarity. In 1928, the African workers at the Ideal 
Laundry struck in support of a white woman employee who had been victimized. (60) In 
1929, a mutual defence pact was agreed between the black Furniture Workers' Union and 
the registered union. The pact was observed by African workers in October, but in 
November, during a strike of 200 African and Coloured matress makers, the white workers 
scabbed. The leadership of the registered union contemplated resigning in disgust 
over the incident. (61) 
Despite the backwardness of white workers, there is evidence of genuine 
solidarity. This showed itself in terms of trade union organization when the garment, 
leather, fwrniture and canvas unions dropped their colour-bar against Coloureds and 
Indians. (62) It might be argued that this was merely a ploy to protect the position 
of white workers in these industries. Wen so, those who were admitted benefited from 
trade union membership. F'urthermore, the GWU and the Furniture Workers' Union (63) 
held joint meetings with their African parallels, whilst the European and African 
launilry workers' unions actually both affiliated to a joint executive committee. (64) 
Although mixed unions had existed for many years in the Cape, these activities marked 
a breakthrough on the Rand, and it might be argued that this contributed towards the 
beginnings of a more ltenli&tenedIt racial policy on the part of the TUC. In 1929 
SATUC recommended to its affiliated unions ('the enrolment of all employees in their 
respective unions, irrespective of race or colour ... or, alternatively that a policy 
of parallel branches in the unions be adoptedtt. (65) 
The ItnewlI unions revived the techniques of industrial militancy, which had 
lain dormant since 1922. Evidence of the militancy of the new unions has already been 
given. The GWU, for instance, led over 100 strikes, two o.f which brought the entire 
industry on the Witwatersrand to a standstill, between 1928 and 1932. Althou#~ the 
union was later to make full use of conciliation machinery, Sachs maintained that the 
strike weapon should never be given up. (66) 
It is, then, in the peculiar industrialization of the 1920s that one must 
look for the origins of the radical, non-racial tradition in South African trade 
unionism. This tradition was carried forward for two decades by a group of trade 
union organizers which included names such as Sachs, Weinbren, Merkel and Kalk, from 
the registered trade unions; La Gwna, who helped organize unions in the Cape during 
the 1930s (67); Moses Kotane and Gana Makabeni, both workers, who were to play a 
leading role in the revival of black trade unionism during the late 1930s and the war 
years. The impact of the "new unionismtf is best demonstrated at the Cape Conference 
held jointly by the Cape Federation of Labour Unions and SATUC in 1930, which resulted 
in the forrnation of the Trades and Labour Counci1,specifically on a non-racial basis. 
The new unions, in the words of Simons and Simons, "had begun to change the balance of 
forces in the movement". (68) 
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